This work examines the role of penalties as providers of incentives to prevent medical errors and ensure that such incidents, once they occur, become common knowledge. It is shown that a scheme with two penalties (accountability and non-report) induces the first-best solution. However, this...

This paper considers a model with a sponsor and several bureaus to analyse the role of sharing rules. Various incentives for budget overspending are identified; among them the overspending of budgets due to soft budget constraints. Four different sharing rules are also considered that differ with...

This work evaluates policy recommendations on medical error reporting systems presented in, To err is human, a report published by the Institute of Medicine. Here mandatory reporting should be applied for adverse events, while voluntary reporting is recommended for near misses. This analysis...

This paper studies soil depletion incentives in a dynamic economic model under two different sources of revenue uncertainty (production- and output price risk). The focus is on the long-term effects of risk averse preferences. The land manager is assumed to posses three classes of instruments to...

This paper presents an analysis on economy-environmental interlinkages for Tanzania by using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model based on a social accounting matrix. The purpose of the analysis is to include general equilibrium effects when evaluating two suggested policy measures meant...

This paper concerns optimal emissions of greenhouse gases when catastrophic consequences are possible. A numerical model is presented which takes into account both continuous climate-feedback damages as well as the possibility of a catastrophic outcome. The uncertainty in the model concerns...