We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more...

Governance has become a central topic among policymakers. There is an international consensus that policymaking is evolving from a traditional top-down government approach towards a system of governing that focuses on engaging the citizens within an area (Cabus, 2003). New forms of governance...

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Economics, 2007.

This paper studies discounted stochastic games perfect or imperfect public monitoring and the opportunity to conduct voluntary monetary transfers. We show that for all discount factors every public perfect equilibrium payoff can be implemented with a simple class of equilibria that have a...

Previous analyses of arms races and proliferation are integrated and extended, building from a treatment of the behavioral foundations of weapons acquisitions to a general theory of arms races, with implications for the role of negotiations, the balance of power, the timing of crises, and...