In this note we show that the equilibrium characterized by Biais, Martimort and Rochet (Econometrica, 78, 2000) could have been characterized by using direct mechanisms.

In this note, we argue that in Common Agency games the restriction todeterministic menus is critical. We give an simple example, with complete information and no moral hazard,where an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus.

In this note, we argue that in Common Agency games the restriction todeterministic menus is critical. We give an simple example, with complete information and no moral hazard,where an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus.

Within a framework of optimal taxation a la Mirrlees, we add a new heterogeneity between the individuals who differ not only on their marginal productivity, but also on their initial endowment in a good which is interpreted as an aggregate consumption. We consider other goods in the economy...

In this paper we discuss the interest of applying differential co-payment rates across alternative medical treatments. Two treatment strategies are considered: a "long term strategy" in which patients apply preventive measures before knowing if they have the desease and an "emergency strategy"...