Within a Mirrlees framework of optimal taxation, we add a new heterogeneity between individuals who differ not only in their marginal productivity, but also in their initial endowment of a good which is interpreted as aggregate consumption. We consider other goods, such as public hospital care...

We analyze the income effect on the probability of visiting a doctor from a french survey. We show that for people with low income this probability is increasing with income, even if they have a private insurance

It is often argued that, first, the decision criterion of antitrust authorities should be total social welfare and that, second, mergers increasing the value of this criterion but ending with lower consumer surplus should be allowed in the name of efficiency gains realized by merging firms. This...

In this paper we discuss the interest of applying differential co-payment rates across alternative medical treatments. Two treatment strategies are considered: a long term strategy in which patients apply preventive measures before knowing if they have the disease and an emergency strategy where...

In this note we argue that in Common Agency games, the restriction to deterministic menus is crucial. We give an simple example (complete information, no moral hazard) in which an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus

In this note, we argue that in Common Agency games the restriction todeterministic menus is critical. We give an simple example, with complete information and no moral hazard,where an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus.

In this paper we discuss the interest of applying differential co-payment rates across alternative medical treatments. Two treatment strategies are considered: a "long term strategy" in which patients apply preventive measures before knowing if they have the desease and an "emergency strategy"...

Within a framework of optimal taxation a la Mirrlees, we add a new heterogeneity between the individuals who differ not only on their marginal productivity, but also on their initial endowment in a good which is interpreted as an aggregate consumption. We consider other goods in the economy...

In this note, we argue that in Common Agency games the restriction todeterministic menus is critical. We give an simple example, with complete information and no moral hazard,where an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus.

In this note we show that the equilibrium characterized by Biais, Martimort and Rochet (Econometrica, 78, 2000) could have been characterized by using direct mechanisms.