Under asymmetric information, entry-deterring strategies by an incumbent monopolist can consist of deviations from its … pricing. Our analysis shows that the mode of post-entry competition influences the range of situations in which an incumbent …

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … sufficiently strong, the expected revenue maximizing entry fee is the maximal fee that guarantees full participation. The larger is …

the relevant information parameter critical for entry. The authors show that entry threat signicantly distorts the wage …, however, wage agreements can be made public, signalling occurs with or without distortions in the full information wages …. Pooling equilibrium in wage also exists. The paper also examines whether wage or price is the preferred signalling device, and …

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … sufficiently strong, the expected revenue maximizing entry fee is the maximal fee that guarantees full participation. The larger is …