This paper studies the effects of government guarantees on the interconnection between banking and sovereign debt crises in a framework where both the banks and the government are fragile and the credibility and feasibility of the guarantees are determined endogenously. The analysis delivers...

Loan guarantees represent a form of government intervention to support bank lending. However, their use raises concerns as to their effect on bank risk-taking incentives. In a model of financial fragility that incorporates bank capital and a bank incentive problem, we show that loan guarantees...

The architecture of supervision - how we define the allocation of supervisory powers to different policy institutions - can have implications for policy conduct and for the economic and financial environment in which these policies are implemented. Theoretically, an integrated structure for...

We develop a model where banks invest in reserves and loans, and face aggregate liquidity shocks. Banks with liquidity shortage sell loans on the interbank market. Two equilibria emerge. In the no default equilibrium, all banks hold enough reserves and remain solvent. In the mixed equilibrium,...

This paper analyzes the role of liquidity regulation and its interaction with capital requirements. We first introduce costly capital in a bank run model with endogenous bank portfolio choice and run probability, and show that capital regulation is the only way to restore the efficient...

Banks are intrinsically fragile because of their role as liquidity providers. This results in under-provision of liquidity. We analyze the effect of government guarantees on the interconnection between banks' liquidity creation and likelihood of runs in a model of global games, where banks' and...