other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding … every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small amount of noise. Furthermore, there exists a level of noise that makes … it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the model without …

) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is … and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications …

informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation …

informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation …

centralization and delegation, and (iii) two-way communication with an informed principal …

' opinions into his/her own decision-making, affects the precision of communication with experts when communication is strategic … private information. We demonstrate that the precision of communication with one expert monotonously increases in sensitivity … communication with the other expert is not necessarily negative and is dependent on the heterogeneity in type distributions of all …

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information … by an experiment. Finally, we show how partial information transmission can lead to communication failure, and show how …