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sector has produced menus of contract terms, such as standard form contracts and model documents, long before the idea of … statutory menus became fashionable. There is no evidence that the market for private menus has failed, and legislatures are … unlikely to be efficient menu producers. Advocates of statutory menus have suggested a number of rationales, most notably …
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This paper considers games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously with the same agent. We introduce a new class of revelation mechanisms that, although it does not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, it facilitates the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes...
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In this note we argue that in Common Agency games, the restriction to deterministic menus is crutial.We give an simple … example (complete information, no moral hazard) in which an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005022222
By identifying types whose low-order beliefs, up to level l(sub i), about the state of nature coincide, we obtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topological properties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369124
In this paper I consider games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. I focus on the problem of characterizing the equilibrium outcomes of such games. I first show that, to solve this problem, one can invoke neither Myerson’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369126
This paper models an agent in an infinite horizon setting who does not update according to Bayes' Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. Choice-theoretic axiomatic foundations are provided. Then the model is specialized axiomatically to capture...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808122