We show that the liquidation value of collateral depends on who is pledging it. We employ transaction-level data on … overnight repurchase agreements (repo) and loan-level credit registry data on corporate loans. We find that borrowers on the … collateral that they pledge. The premium in corporate loan markets amounts to 25 basis points. Our results imply that liquidation …

which crises happen when credit booms change to an information regime with careful examination of collateral. As this …Credit Booms are not rare; some end in a crisis (bad booms) while others do not (good booms). We document that credit … examination is more valuable when collateral backs projects with low productivity, crises are more likely during booms that …

Credit booms are not rare and usually precede financial crises. However, some end in a crisis (bad booms) while others … do not (good booms). We document that credit booms start with an increase in productivity, which subsequently falls much … faster during bad booms. We develop a model in which crises happen when credit markets change to an information regime with …