This paper studies an information design problem in a sequential consumer search environment. Consumers, whose valuation of firm's products is uncertain, observe a noisy signal about the valuation upon being matched with a firm. The goal is to characterize those signal structures that maximize...

This paper uses a mechanism design without transfer approach to investigate the optimal communication mechanism in a two-division organization. The principal, with perfect commitment power on multiple decision rules, wants decisions to be both adapted to local conditions and coordinated with...

This paper studies the welfare effects of information in a sequential consumer search environment. Consumers search in the market and observe a noisy signal about the match value upon being matched with a firm, based on which they make their purchasing decisions. We construct the class of...

This paper studies the welfare effects of information in a sequential consumer search environment. Consumers search in the market and observe a noisy signal about the match value upon being matched with a firm, based on which they make their purchasing decisions. We construct the class of...

This note extends Wiseman [6] to more general reputation games with exogenous learning. Using Gossner's [4] relative entropy method, we provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the long-lived player. The lower bound shows that when the exogenous signals are sufficiently...

This paper studies the reputation effect in which a long-lived player faces a sequence of uninformed short-lived players and the uninformed players receive informative but noisy exogenous signals about the type of the long-lived player. We provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium...