unique equilibrium, which is separating. Higher-quality sellers post higher prices, so price signals quality. The arrival … higher continuation values. For some parameter values, higher-quality sellers post the full-information price; for other … values these sellers have to post a higher price to keep lower-quality sellers from mimicking them. In an extension, we show …

unique equilibrium, which is separating. Higher-quality sellers post higher prices, so price signals quality. The arrival … higher continuation values. For some parameter values, higher-quality sellers post the full-information price; for other … values these sellers have to post a higher price to keep lower-quality sellers from mimicking them. In an extension, we show …

We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers are heterogeneous in … neither. We show that two types of signalling equilibria are possible. Both are characterised by dispersion and Pareto …-inefficiency of the price/quality offers. But, better price/quality combinations are signalled with lower prices in one type and with …

that there is always a strictly positive price-quality relation in equilibrium but the classical adverse selection effects …

We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among … vertical quality (e.g., consumer satisfaction), which is signaled via price, softens price competition, and that imperfect …

This paper offers a dynamic model of opaque over-the-counter markets. A seller searches for an attractive price by … repeat contact with a buyer reveals the seller's reduced outside options and worsens the price offered by the revisited buyer …