Equity and Effectiveness of Optimal Taxation in Contests under an All-Pay Auction
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Mealem, Yosef ; Nitzan, Shmuel |
Institutions: | CESifo |
Subject: | contest design | revenue maximization | balanced-budget constraint | budget surplus | optimal differential taxation | endogenous stakes | all-pay auction | lottery |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 3712 |
Classification: | D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation |
Source: |
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Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction
Mealem, Yosef, (2012)
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Differential Prize Taxation and Structural Discrimination in Contests
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