Peer Punishment in Teams: Emotional or Strategic Choice?

Punishing the free-riders of a team can promote group efficiency but is costly for the punisher. For this reason, economists see punishment as a second-order public good. We show in an experiment that subjects do not value punishment for its deterrence but instead for the satisfaction of retaliating. Punishment choices are made with little strategic reasoning.

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Year of publication:	2006-04
Authors:	Casari, Marco ; Luini, Luigi
Institutions:	Krannert School of Management, Purdue University
Subject:	experiments \| public goods \| informal punishment \| emotions \| legal systems

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Purdue University Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	37 pages
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005786799