The Costs of Favoritism : Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
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Authors: | Dreher, Axel ; Klasen, Stephan ; Vreeland, James Raymond ; Werker, Eric |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Internationale Staatsschulden | International sovereign debt | Projektbewertung | Project evaluation | Entwicklungsprojekt | Development project | Entwicklungshilfe | Development aid | Welt | World | Mitgliedschaft | Membership | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Entwicklungsfinanzierung | Development finance | Internationale Sicherheit | International security | Internationale Organisation | International organization |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (49 p) |
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Series: | CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 2993 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2010 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.1581342 [DOI] |
Classification: | O19 - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations ; O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; F35 - Foreign Aid |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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