The Regulation of Labor
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment laws, collective bargaining laws, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that richer countries regulate labor less than poorer countries do, although they have more generous social security systems. The political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems. Socialist and French legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries, and the inclusion of legal origin wipes out the effect of the political power of the left. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with a larger unofficial economy, lower labor force participation, and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are difficult to reconcile with efficiency and political power theories of institutional choice, but are broadly consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems
Year of publication: |
[2021]
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Authors: | Botero, Juan Carlos ; Djankov, Simeon ; La Porta, Rafael ; Lopez de Silanes, Florencio ; Shleifer, Andrei |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Welt | World | Regulierung | Regulation | Arbeitsrecht | Labour law | Arbeitsmarktpolitik | Labour market policy | Tarifverhandlungen | Collective bargaining | Arbeitsmarktflexibilität | Labour market flexibility | Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung | Public pension system | Vergleich | Comparison |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (61 p) |
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Series: | NBER Working Paper ; No. w9756 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 2003 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013244876