中国的竞次增长模式：以货车超载和公路收费为例 (China’s Race-to-the-Bottom Growth Model : A Case Study of Vehicle Overloading and Highway Tolls)

内容摘要：本文用一个简单模型探讨了中国出口导向型发展的政治经济学机理。本文认为，自1990年代以来，中国的出口导向型发展战略逐渐演变成一种在相当程度上依靠竞次即降低生产监管标准来维持成本优势和经济增长的“竞次增长模式”。竞次导致全要素生产率的虚假增长和人民币实际汇率的低估，带动出口和收入迅速增长，由此产生的国民收入增量我们称之为竞次租。在此过程中，竞次租的绝大部分被政府及掌握公共权力的特殊利益集团所获取，而实际工资增长缓慢，从而形成了畸高的宏观税负水平和严重的收入分配失衡。同时，收入分配失衡导致国内消费需求萎缩，使得较低的实际汇率得以维持。如果消除竞次，那么历史形成的高宏观税负水平将推动实际汇率大幅升值，令出口导向型发展难以为继。本文对货车超载和公路收费所作的案例分析，印证了这一观点。This paper explores the political economy of China's export-led growth using a simple numerical model. We argue that since the 1990s China's export-led growth strategy has gradually turned into a model that largely relies on 'racing-to-the-bottom' (RTB) – strategic lowering of production standards – for achieving cost-competitiveness and income growth, a so-called 'RTB growth model'. RTB has led to spurious total factor productivity growth and undervaluation of the RMB real exchange rate, spurring export and fueling strong growth in national income which we call 'RTB-rent'. However, this RTB-rent largely accrues to the government and government-related special interest groups with stagnant real wage growth, as reflected by China's heavy macro-tax burden and severe income inequality. The skewed income distribution in turn helps to maintain the undervalued real exchange rate by depressing internal consumption demand. If RTB is eliminated, then the existing level of China's macro tax burden will almost certainly cause a spike in the RMB real exchange rate, jeopardizing its export-led growth. Our case analysis of vehicle overloading and highway tolls in China confirms the above theorizing