本論文は、①東日本大震災による人的・物的な被害、②津波被災地域の大震災前の社会経済状況、③大震災前後の日本経済を取り巻いた国際環境、④日本政府が抱えていた財政状況、⑤震災復興からの回復過程が、どのように政策決定者の間で認識されてきたのかを実証的に解明している。その上で、これらの側面における政策決定者の認識の錯誤が、過大な規模の震災復興予算につながり、震災復興政策において非効率的な資源配分を招いてしまったことを明らかにしている。, This paper empirically explores how ineffectively policymakers recognized (i) the casualty and physical damages caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake, (ii) the social and economic states of the tsunami-damaged areas prior to the occurrence of the disaster, (iii) the global economic conditions which surrounded the Japanese economy before and after the Earthquake, (iv) the fiscal condition faced by the Japanese Government, and (v) the economic recovery process from the disaster. Given those findings, it demonstrates that their serious mistakes in recognition of the above aspects led eventually to an excessively large national budget for reconstruction from the disaster, and resulted in inefficient allocation of scarce resources in the reconstruction policy.
