3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side

We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.

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Year of publication:	2001-12-17
Authors:	Renault, Jérôme
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 30.2001, 2, p. 221-245
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	repeated games \| incomplete information \| lack of information on one side \| 3 players \| uniform equilibrium \| existence of equilibria

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755782