A bargaining approach to the consistent value for NTU games with coalition structure

The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for NTU games is generalized so that a coalition structure among players is taken into account. The new mechanism yields the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure as well as the consistent value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992) for NTU games with trivial coalition structure. Furthermore, we obtain a solution for pure bargaining problems with coalition structure which generalizes the Nash (1950) bargaining solution.

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Year of publication:	2003-03-11
Authors:	Vidal-Puga, Juan
Institutions:	EconWPA
Keywords:	NTU consistent bargaining stationary subgame perfect equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP; pages: 37 ; figures: included 37 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550900