A Bureaucratic Model of Judicial Success in the Office of the Solicitor General
The solicitor general of the United States occupies a unique position in the federal government, not only as the only member of the government legally required to be learned in the law, but also as the main legal representation of the United States. Beginning with Galanter (1974) and continuing with McGuire (1998), Songer, Sheehan, and Haire (1999), and most recently Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman (2005), researchers have showed that solely by the solicitor general's involvement in a case, either as amici or counsel, the federal courts are significantly more likely to decide in favor of the side the solicitor general favors. The Office of the Solicitor General however does not contain simply one individual. There are three ranks of attorneys within the office; the Solicitor General, deputies, and assistants. Following Lewis (2007), I argue that should be meaningful differences between these individuals based upon the hierarchy of their bureaucracy. These differences, I hypothesize, will lead to different determinants of success before the Supreme Court