A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
Year of publication: |
1999
|
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Authors: | Williams, Steven R. |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 14.1999, 1, p. 155-180
|
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Effizienz | Efficiency | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Theorie | Theory |
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