A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions Which Lead to Impossibility Theorems.
For some game theoretic solution concepts, such as dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, and undominated strategies, only dictatorial social choice functions are implementable on a full domain of preferences with at least three alternatives. For other solution concepts, such as the iterative removal of weakly dominated strategies, undominated Nash equilibrium, and maximin, it is possible to implement nondictatorial social choice functions. Which aspects of solution concepts accounts for these differences? The authors answer this question by providing a characterization of solution concepts which lead to impossibility results. Copyright 1996 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Jackson, Matthew O ; Srivastava, Sanjay |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0034-6527. - Vol. 63.1996, 1, p. 23-38
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
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