A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ju, Biung-Ghi |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 33.2005, 3, p. 335-354
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Plurality | Strategy-proofness | Efficiency | Restricted efficiency | Anonymity | Division indifference | Separable preferences |
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