A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

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Year of publication:	2002-01-01
Authors:	Volij, Oscar ; Dagan, Nir ; Winter, Eyal
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Iowa State University

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Series:	Staff General Research Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Social Choice and Welfare 2002, vol. 19, pp. 811-823
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005154831