A climate agreement with full participation

Using a repeated-game model, we demonstrate that by limiting the punishment for non-compliance, a climate agreement with full participation can be sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium even without watering down abatement levels.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Froyn, Camilla Bretteville ; Hovi, Jon
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 99.2008, 2, p. 317-319
Publisher:	Elsevier

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005361728