A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict
This paper provides a comparative analysis of the basic rent-seeking model and a simple economic model of conflict. Each model is concerned with a game in which players invest resources in pursuit of a prize. The purpose of the analysis is to elucidate structural differences between the two models, and to analyse the consequent behavioral differences and equilibrium outcomes in the two cases. A key finding is that, where such comparisons are possible, the conflict model tends to involve greater relative expenditure on wealth-redistribution activities than does the rent-seeking model. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Neary, Hugh |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 93.1997, 3, p. 373-388
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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