A comparison of theoretical and empirical evaluations of the Borda Compromise
The Borda Compromise states that, if one has to choose among five popular voting rules that are not Condorcet consistent, one should always give preference to the Borda rule over the four other rules. We assess the theoretical as well as the empirical support for the Borda Compromise. We find that, despite considerable differences between the properties of the theoretical framework and the characteristics of two sets of observed ranking data, all three analyses provide considerable support for the Borda Compromise. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Gehrlein, William ; Plassmann, Florenz |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 43.2014, 3, p. 747-772
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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