A conflict between sequential rationality and consistency principles
Year of publication: |
2002-10-02
|
---|---|
Authors: | Quesada, Antonio |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 31.2002, 1, p. 13-18
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Sequential rationality | equilibrium refinements | consistent solution concepts |
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