A Credit Mechanism for Selecting a Unique Competitive Equilibrium

A credit mechanism is considered that selects a unique competitive equilibrium (CE) of an exchange economy. It is shown that a price normalization calling for a fixed monetary value for the total wealth in the economy and the addition of appropriate default penalties together result in a construction of a simple credit mechanism that selects a unique CE. The selection can be utilized to pick a CE that minimizes the need for trust in trade

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Year of publication:	[2006]
Authors:	Qin, Cheng-Zhong
Other Persons:	Shubik, Martin (contributor)
Publisher:	[2006]: [S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (16 p)
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper ; No. 1539R
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 2006 erstellt
Classification:	D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; E4 - Money and Interest Rates
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012783357