A Critical Analysis of the Nigerian Offshore Oil Risk Governance Regime (Post Macondo)

This paper considered the question: To ‘what extent is the legal regime for risk governance adequate to prevent offshore oil risk-related accidents like the Deepwater Horizon accident in Nigeria?' It argued that the Petroleum Act 1969 and the ancillary regulations are inadequate in many respects. First, the prescriptive nature of the existing regulations under the Act is unsuitable for effective risk governance because the offshore oil environment is continually evolving and cannot be effectively regulated by prescriptive laws. Secondly, there is a potential conflict of interest between the dual function of the regulator as the revenue driver and, risk governance body. Thirdly, there is an absence of a dichotomy between the regulated and regulator which undermines effective offshore risk governance amongst other defects. The Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB) was analysed to ascertain whether it is a progression of the Petroleum Act 1969 in this respect. It was argued that the PIGB has progressed in some respects in resolving some of the identified deficiencies. One of such progression is the creation of a regulator, that is completely separated from the regulated. However, the PIGB preserves the provisions of the Petroleum Act 1969 and, ancillary regulations, thereby retaining some of its shortcomings. Some recommendations were made to address the identified shortcomings. A key recommendation is that the PIGB should be amended to underpin a goal setting method of regulation for offshore oil risk governance