A decentralized and informationally efficient mechanism realizing fair outcomes in economies with public goods
Year of publication: |
1994
|
---|---|
Authors: | Aizpurua, Jose ; Manresa, Antonio |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 1.1994, 1, p. 141-158
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Mechanism design | Fair allocations | Public goods |
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