A DIFFERENTIAL GAME OF POLLUTION CONTROL WITH OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS

We formulate an overlapping generations model on optimal emissions with continuous age structure. We compare the noncooperative solution to the cooperative one and obtain fundamental differences in the optimal strategies. Also including an altruistic motive does not avoid the problem of the myopic noncooperative solution. Finally we define a time-consistent tax scheme to obtain the cooperative solution in the noncooperative case.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	WRZACZEK, STEFAN ; SHEVKOPLYAS, EKATERINA ; KOSTYUNIN, SERGEY
Published in:	International Game Theory Review (IGTR). - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., ISSN 1793-6675. - Vol. 16.2014, 03, p. 1450005-1
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Subject:	Differential game \| overlapping generations \| pollution \| Pontryagin's Maximum Principle \| Nash equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	B4 - Economic Methodology ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; M2 - Business Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765573