A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The Boomerang Effect and Grant-Back Clauses
This paper develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on R&D competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant-back clauses. Of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the "grant-back" clause can mitigate this distortion. I also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant-back clauses may adversely affect competition because they reduce the licensee's incentive to engage in R&D and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets.
Year of publication: |
1999
|
---|---|
Authors: | Choi, Jay Pil |
Institutions: | CESifo |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents
Choi, Jay Pil, (2014)
-
Asymmetric Neutrality Regulation and Innovation at the Edges: Fixed vs. Mobile Networks
Choi, Jay Pil, (2014)
-
Optimal Compatibility in Systems Markets
Kim, Sang-Hyun, (2014)
- More ...