A dynamic duopoly investment game without commitment under uncertain market expansion
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Boyer, Marcel ; Lasserre, Pierre ; Moreaux, Michel |
Published in: |
International Journal of Industrial Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187. - Vol. 30.2012, 6, p. 663-681
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Real options | Dynamic duopoly | Lumpy investments | Preemption | Investment waves | Tacit collusion |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Source: |
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