A dynamic mechanism design for controllable and ergodic Markov games
Year of publication: |
2023
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---|---|
Authors: | Clempner, Julio B. |
Published in: |
Computational economics. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1572-9974, ZDB-ID 1477445-8. - Vol. 61.2023, 3, p. 1151-1171
|
Subject: | Bayesian equilibrium | Dynamic mechanism design | Incentive-compatible mechanisms | Markov games with private information | Regularization | Markov-Kette | Markov chain | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference |
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