A Firm Bargaining with Many Workers

The purpose of this paper is to analyze bargaining between a firm and a finite set of workers. In particular employment choice and the payoffs in equilibrium are studied. In the model, the firm first selects the workers it wants to hire. The selected workers then decide whether they want to proceed in bargaining with the firm. Finally, bargaining takes place. We assume contracts are binding.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Westermark, A.
Institutions:	Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet
Subject:	LABOUR \| BARGAINING

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Series:	Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	25 pages
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D21 - Firm Behavior ; J23 - Employment Determination; Job Creation; Demand for Labor; Self-Employment
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634562