A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure

In this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining problems with coalition structure, of several values which have been proposed on the class of non-transferable utility games with coalition structure. We prove that all of them coincide with the solution independently studied in Chae and Heidhues (2004) and Vidal-Puga (2005a). Several axiomatic characterizations and two noncooperative mechanisms are proposed.

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Year of publication:	2005-11-16
Authors:	Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Méndez, Balbina Casas- ; Janeiro, Gloria Fiestras- ; Vidal-Puga, Juan
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	coalition structure bargaining values

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31 31 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407618