A Folk Theorem for Bargaining Games
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Herings, P. Jean-Jacques |
Other Persons: | Meshalkin, Andrey (contributor) ; Predtetchinski, Arkadi (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (28 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 20, 2012 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.2185357 [DOI] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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