A folk theorem for minority games
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Renault, Jérôme ; Scarlatti, Sergio ; Scarsini, Marco |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 53.2005, 2, p. 208-230
|
Subject: | Signalling | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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