A folk theorem for minority games.
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Renault, Jérôme ; Scarlatti, Sergio ; Scarsini, Marco |
Institutions: | Université Paris-Dauphine |
Subject: | Repeated games | Imperfect monitoring | Public signals |
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