A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Pȩski, Marcin ; Wiseman, Thomas |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 10.2015, 1, p. 131-173
|
Subject: | Stochastic games | folk theorem | Stochastisches Spiel | Stochastic game | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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