A General Coalition Structure: Some Equivalence Results

TThe formation of coalition may imply some theoretical difficulties, such as costs arising from forming a coalition or sharing information among agents. In this paper we will assume that only a subset S of the set of all possible coalitions in an economy is the set of admissible coalitions. We define the S-core concept, as in Hervs-Moreno. We will extend to a model with both uncertainty and asymmetric informations the results showed in Okuda and Shitovitz.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2013-12
Authors:	Bimonte, Giovanna
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche (DISES), Università degli Studi di Salerno
Subject:	Differential information economy \| restriction on coalition formation \| private core

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers. - ISSN 1971-3029.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Working Papers, July 2014, pages 1-12 Number 3_230
Classification:	D51 - Exchange and Production Economies ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860337