A general framework for robust contracting models
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Walton, Daniel ; Carroll, Gabriel |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1468-0262, ZDB-ID 1477253-X. - Vol. 90.2022, 5, p. 2129-2159
|
Subject: | Principal-agent problem | hierarchical contracting | robustness | linear contracts | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Robustes Verfahren | Robust statistics | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
-
Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies
Hubert, Emma, (2023)
-
Robust contracting under double moral hazard
Carroll, Gabriel, (2023)
-
Robust contracting with additive noise
Carroll, Gabriel, (2016)
- More ...
-
On using interval response data in experimental economics
McDonald, James B., (2018)
-
Shoven, John B., (2023)
-
On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
Carroll, Gabriel, (2018)
- More ...