A generalization of Condorcet's Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Lindner, Ines |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 35.2008, 3, p. 607-611
|
Subject: | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Theorie | Theory |
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