A hybrid game with conditional and unconditional veto power

In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.

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Year of publication:	2014-05-14
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Levati, M. Vittoria ; Montinari, Natalia ; Nardi, Chiara
Institutions:	Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Subject:	Ultimatum \| Yes/No game

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Jena Economic Research Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2014-015
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779440