A labor market with targeted wage offers
We model a market for highly skilled workers, such as the academic job market. The outputs of ?rm-worker matches are heterogeneous and common knowledge. Wage setting is synchronous with search: ?rms simultaneously make one personalized offer each to the worker of their choice. With large frictions (delay costs), efficient coordination is not possible, but for small frictions efficient matching with Diamond-type monopsony wages is an equilibrium.
Year of publication: |
2011-06-24
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Authors: | Sákovics, József |
Institutions: | School of Economics, University of Edinburgh |
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