A Laboratory Experiment to Compare Two Market Institutions for Emissions Trading
Year of publication: |
2010-11
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ghosh, Gaurav ; Kwasnica, Anthony ; Shortle, James |
Institutions: | Institut für Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN), E.ON Energy Research Center |
Subject: | Experimental Economics | Market Design | Oligopsony | Stochastic Pollution |
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