A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
The present paper studies repeated games with private monitoring, and characterizes the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in the limit as the discount factor approaches one and the noise on private information vanishes. Contrary to the conjecture by Ely et al. [J.C. Ely, J. Hörner, W. Olszewski, Belief-free equilibria in repeated games, Econometrica 73 (2005) 377-415], the equilibrium payoff set is computed by the same formula, no matter how many players there are. As an application of this result, a version of the folk theorem is established for N-player prisoner's dilemma games.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Yamamoto, Yuichi |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 144.2009, 2, p. 802-824
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Repeated game Private monitoring Almost-perfect monitoring Belief-free equilibrium Characterization |
Saved in:
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