A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Kirkegaard, René |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 80.2012, 5, p. 2349-2364
|
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Ranking-Verfahren | Ranking method | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Theorie | Theory |
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