A mechanism design approach to the tiebout hypothesis
Year of publication: |
April 2018
|
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Authors: | Jehiel, Philippe ; Lamy, Laurent |
Published in: |
Journal of political economy. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. Press, ISSN 0022-3808, ZDB-ID 3026-0. - Vol. 126.2018, 2, p. 735-760
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Subject: | Steuerwettbewerb | Tax competition | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Lokale öffentliche Güter | Local public goods | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Theorie | Theory |
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